We would like to thank Neha Samdaria for her diligent research assistance. Of course, all the controversial interpretations, and any errors, are our own. On the basis of these models, in conjunction with a detailed event study and analysis of institutional stock holdings and short sales data, we conclude that the run-up cannot be explained as a rational reaction to fundamental information. Instead, we conclude that at the end of the run-up the stock was overvalued by approximately 150 percent. In our view, the case study provides support for Summers assertion the price and rational value can diverge significantly for prolonged periods of time.
Introduction
Despite extensive literature on the subject, the question of whether and how market sentiment affects stock prices remains an interesting and unresolved question. 1 Following DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990) , investor sentiment is here defined as a belief about future cash flows and investment risks that is not justified by the facts at hand. In this paper, we extend that literature by examining one particular event in detail. That event is an almost sevenfold increase in the price of Tesla in less than one year. On March 22, 2013 Tesla was trading at $36.62. By February 26, 2014, the price had risen 590.9% to $253.00. (Tesla does not pay a dividend so the price path reflects the total return on the stock.) In comparison, the total return on the S&P 500 index during the same interval was a much more modest 20.4%, so that the total net of market return over the period for Tesla was 471.1%. An equal weighted index of the other major automotive manufacturers listed on American exchanges closely matched the overall market during the interval rising 16.2%, so Tesla's jump clearly was not industry related. The index of major automotive manufacturers is composed of the four major companies, GM, Ford, Toyota, and Honda that are available through CRSP. Expanding the index to include other manufacturers has no noticeable impact on the results. beginning on March 22, 2013, the two paths diverge dramatically. This paper studies that sudden shift and the subsequent dramatic run-up. In particular, we attempt to isolate the possible role played by market sentiment.
--Exhibit 1 here --Of course, large increases in the price of individual stocks, though rare, are hardly unprecedented. However, Tesla is special along a variety of dimensions that make it a uniquely useful test case for studying whether market sentiment played a role in the runup. First, Tesla is part of large, mature and well defined industry. By 2012, the manufacturing of automobiles had matured to the point where the long-run growth rate of the industry closely mirrored long-run aggregate growth. This is helpful because much of the debate regarding the role of sentiment during the internet boom of the 1990s, and to an extent during the current social media boom, is over the extent to which sharp run-ups in prices can be attributed to rational assessment of industry growth. Because forecasting growth rates for newly developing industries like social media typically requires making assumptions that are hard to verify on the basis of historical data, unambiguous conclusions are difficult to draw. Second, the mature state of the industry also makes it easy to identify comparable companies. This is helpful because comparable company analysis is a useful tool in valuation analysis. In addition, the slow, predictable growth of the aggregate market implies that a sudden, dramatic change in the value of Tesla stock means that Tesla must be expected to profit at the expense of competitors, so it is important to be able to identify those competitors unambiguously.
Third, the available technologies in the industry are largely known and innovations are incremental. There is not the "Twitter" problem where much of the value of a company is attributable to growth options related to some as of yet unspecified technology. Even Tesla, trumpeted as an innovator in the automotive industry, uses electric motor technology that has been widely available for years and relies on established battery technology and batteries provided by third party suppliers.
Fourth, the stable nature of the business implies that the expected return, whichever model is used to estimate it, should not be changing rapidly. Therefore, when investigating the sudden divergence of the stock price from movements in the market and the industry it is not necessary to waste time worrying about the changes being due to variation in the discount rate.
Fifth, the run-up in the price of Tesla occurred over almost a year. Therefore, it cannot be related to the market learning of a few pieces of previously undisclosed information. It must reflect an on-going reassessment of the long-term prospects of the company, though not necessarily a rational one.
Finally, there is the added bonus that one of us, Damodaran ( , 2014 , developed a detailed discounted cash flow models for Tesla in real time and posted the results online on September 4, 2013 and March 25, 2014. As discussed in detail below, the models were calibrated using what we believe to be optimistic assumptions regarding Tesla's future growth and operating margins. Nonetheless, the estimated values for Tesla were $72.00 in September 2013 and $100.31 in March 2014. In both cases this is only about 40 percent of the market price. If market prices continue to exceed model prices, or in the more extreme case that the gap widens, it is evidence that either our calibrating assumptions were too pessimistic or that the market prices are inconsistent with the DCF valuation.
We also employ standard analytical tools, including an event study and an examination of the holdings (including shorts) of Tesla stock, to supplement our valuation analysis. Here too we find evidence that the run-up cannot be attributed to a rational evaluation of fundamental news. Tesla's first car, the Tesla Roadster, a high-performance electric sports car, was a moderate success. On June 12, 2012, Tesla began deliveries of its Model S, a four door, five-passenger premium sedan. The reviews of the car were highly favorable and it was well received by customers.
Currently, Tesla manufacturers cars at its factory in Fremont, California. The company also has an electric powertrain manufacturing facility in Palo Alto, California.
In addition to building cars, the company provides services for the development of electric powertrain components and sells electric powertrain components to other automotive manufacturers.
Pricing versus Valuation: Convergence and Divergence
Though the words "price" and "value" are often used interchangeably, here they mean different things. For a cash flow generating asset or business, we define value to be the present value of a rational forecast of future cash flows. Because "rational" is in the eye of the beholder, value cannot be observed and has to be estimated. When we use the term value in this paper, we mean our estimate of value. Price, on the other hand, is determined by supply and demand in the market place. That supply and demand may depend on factors other than rational estimates of future cash flow. Exhibit 2 lays out the contrast:
--Exhibit 2 here --Rather than rehashing old debates about price and value, we use the evolution of Tesla as a case study of how both value and price evolve in the market. The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we develop DCF models to estimate the value of Tesla under what we consider to be a set of aggressively optimistic assumptions. Next, we compare those estimates to the market price of the stock and find, as noted earlier, that the stock appears to be dramatically overpriced. In step three, we study the trading behavior of the stock both in terms of how it responded to information and in terms of changes in institutional holdings and short sales. We find further evidence consistent with that from the valuation analysis -the sharp run-up in Tesla stock far exceeds that which can be explained by fundamentals. Investor sentiment must at least be part of the story.
The DCF Valuation Models for Tesla
While the process for valuing mature businesses is well established and described, there remain substantial differences of opinion regarding how that process should be applied to young companies. The approach we use is that described by . This approach focuses on four basic inputs. The first input is the expected cash flow from existing assets. The second input is expected growth, with growth in operating income being the key input. Because this growth requires investment, the value effect of growth will depend upon how efficiently that growth is generated in terms of required investment. The third input is the discount rate, defined as the cost of the overall capital of the firm, when valuing the business, and as cost of equity, when valuing equity. Other things remaining equal, companies that operate in riskier businesses or riskier countries should have higher costs of equity and capital than companies in stable businesses and developed markets. The final input is the terminal value, defined as the estimated value of firm at the end of the forecast period. This estimate is generally based on the assumption that cash flows will grow at a constant rate forever beyond that point, which in turn, requires the firm to be mature and grow at a rate less than overall economic growth. In the case of Tesla this requires a long forecast horizon because a substantial period of supernormal growth is anticipated.
The challenge with young companies
Looking at the four inputs highlights the problems that analysts face in valuing young companies like Tesla. The cash flows from existing assets are often negative, with operating cash flows being non-existent or small (because the firm's revenues are small) and investing cash flows being large (as the company ramps up for growth). As a result, almost all of the value of the company comes from future growth, but the crutches used to estimate that growth including past growth or sustainable growth models are missing.
In an earlier paper, laid out a three-step process to deal with the estimation challenges raised by young companies. The first step is estimating a revenue growth rate. That estimate, in turn, is driven by an estimate of the growth of the overall market in which the company operates in conjunction with an evaluation of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the company's products and services. The second step is forecasting a target operating margin to which the company's margin will converge to over time. That forecast is typically based on the margins earned by the most comparable mature companies in the industry. The final input is an estimate of the investment required to achieve the forecast growth that is typically derived by examining changes in revenue from period to period and making judgments on how much additional capital will be required to provide for growth.
The discount rate in the valuation (cost of capital) is best estimated by looking at publicly traded companies in the same space as the young company, with the initial estimates being tied to smaller, riskier firms in the sector and the end numbers reflecting larger, more mature firms. While incorporating risk into discount rates is important, it is also important that we keep in mind two other factors. The first is that a significant portion of the risk that young firms are exposed to is company-specific and should be diversifiable at a portfolio level. The second is that young firms have a greater chance of failure than more mature firms, but that survival risk is ill suited for inclusion in the discount rate and is better considered explicitly when valuing the firm. This is because the cash flows to be discounted are expected cash flows, not anticipated cash flows conditional on the company surviving. To take account of this distinction, we introduce an estimated probability of failure, with the expected proceeds in the event of failure (usually liquidation proceeds) being used to compute an expected value.
Tesla's Historical Performance
Though Tesla's history is short, the starting point for assessing future revenue growth is its past track record. Exhibit 3 plots quarterly revenues from inception through the end of 2013 for Tesla. The exhibit shows relatively flat revenue until the introduction of the Model S that led to a burst of growth that then flattens out.
--Exhibit 3 here --Tesla's profits have followed a rockier path, with losses accumulating over time.
While the extent of the losses depends on the choice of measure, for much of Tesla's history, every measure of profitability has been negative. In Exhibit 4, we graph six different measures of earnings:
(a) Gross Profits, i.e., revenues net of cost of goods sold. 
Forecasting Future Cash Flows for Tesla: September 2013 & March 2014
Because Tesla is expected to experience supernormal growth for more than the typical five-year horizon used in most DCF models, we use a ten-year horizon. As 3 To get to the adjusted operating income, we capitalize R&D expenses using a five-year life and straightline amortization. Thus, we add back the R&D expense from the current quarter to the reported operating income and subtract out the amortization of the sum of the R&D expenses over the prior 20 quarters (or as many as are available). described above, the first step in forecasting cash flows is estimating future revenue growth. To provide perspective, Exhibit 6 translates revenue data into growth rates quarter over quarter and current quarter over the same quarter the previous year.
--Exhibit 6 here --Not surprisingly, the growth rate spikes with the introduction of the Model S, but declines after that. We note, however, that Mr. Musk and many analysts see the Model S as only the beginning. Tesla is expected to introduce a lower priced car in 2015 and many analysts foresee future innovation after that. The decision of whether the run-up is due to value creation or sentiment clearly depends on the growth assumption. To give value creation the benefit of the doubt, we choose the most aggressively optimistic assumption that we think can be reasonably defended. The figure we select for future revenue growth, for both the September 2013 and March 2014 DCF valuations, is 70 percent over the entire 10-year forecast period. At a growth rate of 70 percent, Tesla revenues increase by a factor of 50 from the base year to the end of the forecast period. As a result, Tesla rises from a niche player to become a major automotive manufacturer on the order of the position occupied by Audi today.
The next piece is the operating margin. As noted earlier, Tesla is currently operating at a negative margin. However, the critical question is to what margin the company will converge as it matures and takes advantage of economies of scale. Once again, we make an aggressively optimistic choice and assume Tesla margin will converge to a 12.5 percent margin, a number comparable to that achieved by Porsche, one of the most profitable automobile manufacturers.
The final piece is the investment required to realize the dramatic growth in revenues. 4 To provide background, Exhibit 7 plots the history of two key drivers related to required investment, invested capital (and its change) and the sales to capital ratio.
--Exhibit 7 here --A higher sales to capital ratio is reflective of higher quality growth because the company is generating more revenues with relatively less investment. For all of Tesla's history the number has been below 1.0, which is much less than the average for the automobile sector. The results for the last quarter of 2013 suggest that the company is starting to convert its past investments into revenues, as the ratio increases from 0.66 in the third quarter of 2013 to 0.87 in the last quarter of the year. Once again, to be optimistic we assume going forward that the sales to investments ratio will jump to the industry average in the first forecast year and remain there throughout.
The final element of the cash flow forecast is the risk of failure. Given the competitiveness of the automotive industry, and the history of failure of most start-ups, it would not be unreasonable to assume failure probability of ten percent or more for Tesla. Nonetheless, to stay on an optimistic path, we assume that the probability of failure is zero. 4 To illustrate the importance of the investment assumption, one of the events to which Tesla's stock price responded was the release of a Morgan Stanley (2014) analyst report that included a DCF model and a price target of $320. The price target, not surprisingly, was based on a forecast of rapid growth. However, the DCF model included minimal new investment. We observe that correcting this inconsistency reduces the DCF valuation, and presumably the price target, significantly.
The Discount Rate
The discount rate for Tesla is difficult to assess. The volatility of the stock returns for Tesla is on the order of 60 percent per year -much greater than that for other automotive manufacturers and more akin to that for young technology firms. However, much of that risk is idiosyncratic. Consistent with our previous assumptions, we assume that the systematic risk for Tesla can be approximated by using a weighted average of the betas of the technology and automobile sectors, with the weights shifting to the latter as the company's revenues increase. This results in a higher beta (1.28) and cost of capital (10.03%) in the September 2013 valuation than in the March 2014 valuation, where the beta used is 1.22 and the cost of capital is 8.74%. In both valuations, the company is predominantly funded with equity to start the process and the cost of debt has little impact on the valuation.
Within both valuations, we preserve consistency, lowering the cost of capital towards 8.00% (roughly the average for the automobile sector) as we move forward in our forecast period. The adjustment occurs in the second half of the growth period (years 6 through 10) in linear increments. We are, in effect, assuming that Tesla will not only start to see its systematic risk converge towards that of mature automobile companies, but that it will avail itself of its debt capacity over time. --Exhibit 8 here --Given our consistently optimistic assumptions, one might guess that the estimated value would exceed the market price, but Exhibit 8 shows that this is clearly not the case.
The Value Estimates
The estimated value as of September 2013 comes to $72.00 dollars compared to a market price of $168.76 -implying that the stock is overvalued by about 150 percent. In March 2014, the estimated value rises to $100.35. This increase is due almost exclusively to the fact that the base off of which the forecasts are based jumps after the introduction of the Model S. Generally, when starting from a higher base, an analyst will reduce expected growth somewhat because some of the growth story is now in the rear view mirror. Here we do not do that so the estimated value jumps to $100.35. Nonetheless, by March 2014 the stock price has hit $250, so the estimated market overvaluation remains about 150 percent. Given the markedly optimistic nature of all our assumptions, the bottom line of the DCF analysis is that price exceeds rational fundamental value. To examine this possibility further, we take a closer look at the price behavior of the stock
The Pricing Narrative
If the market is rational and relatively efficient, then the run-up in the price of Tesla stock between March 22, 2013 and February 26, 2014 , both in comparison to industry competitors and the market generally, should be the result of information that arrives during that time period. To examine that hypothesis, we begin by isolating days with significant residual changes in Tesla's stock price then check to see if there is the arrival of sufficient new fundamental information to justify the movements on those days.
The Price History
There were 234 trading days during the run-up period. To determine whether the firm-specific Tesla return on any individual day was significant, we define residual returns to be simply Tesla returns net of the return on the S&P 500. This definition has virtually no impact on the results because the significant days are determined almost exclusively by large movements in Tesla stock. To compute t-statistics, the residual return is divided by the standard deviation of the residuals over the interval from January 1, 2011 until the day preceding the start of the run-up period.
Given that the run-up period was defined by Tesla's exceptional stock price performance, one would expect more than 5 percent of the daily returns to be significant at the 5 percent level and more than half of the significant returns to be positive. That is what we find. Of the 234 trading days during the period nineteen (8.1%) were significantly positive and eight (3.5%) are negative. Overall 56 percent of the returns were positive during the run-up period and 44 percent were negative. The ratio is surprisingly close to one given that the sample is conditioned on a run-up of 590 percent.
It must be the case that the positive days were substantially larger in absolute value than the negative days on average. That is what we find. The compound residual return over the twenty days with significantly positive residuals was 740 percent compared to a compound return of (55.3) percent for the eight significantly negative days. Taken together the compound residual return for all the significant days was 275 percent. Thus most of the story of the run-up was associated with the significantly positive days with the skewed ratio of positive to negative returns accounting for the rest.
Price Changes and Fundamental Information Arrival
To examine whether the big residual returns for Tesla during this period were the result of fundamental information reaching the market, we examined the days where the returns were significantly different from zero (either positive or negative). Taken as a whole the event study brings to mind Gertrude Stein's characterization of Oakland -"There is no there, there." The most telling evidence from the evident study is what is missing. There is no new product introduction. There is no proposed acquisition or other transaction. There is no announcement of significant new technology. It is worth noting in this context that the inability to explain price movements is a remarkably consistent characteristic of stock price behavior. Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) and Cornell (2013) examine the largest 50 moves in the overall market during successive 25 year intervals. Both papers reach the conclusion that a majority of even these large market movements cannot be tied to fundamental news. This finding is not so dramatic in the case of individual stocks because many of their large changes are usually associated with earnings surprises. Therefore, to explore further the relation between information arrival and movements in Tesla's stock price, we start with earnings announcements.
Exhibit 9 reports the details for the four earnings announcements during the runup period. Three of the announcements are associated with significant residuals -two positive and one negative. The second two, one positive and one negative, net almost exactly to zero, so the impact of earnings surprises is a total residual return of 24% associated with the first announcement. While this is not trivial, it hardly accounts for the sevenfold increase in price. In addition, the earnings surprise comes to $.08. This translates into about $10 million dollars in added earnings. In comparison, during the run-up the market value of equity jumped from under $5 billion to almost $30 billion.
For the jump to be rational, the story must include much more than the reported earnings surprises.
--Exhibit 9 here --Of course earnings are not the only source of fundamental information. But the full event study presented in Exhibit 10, which summarizes the news associated with all the significant residuals during the run-up period, highlights just how little real information relevant to the valuation of Tesla arrived during the period.
--Exhibit 10 here --The exhibit is broken down into positive and negative residuals with each sorted by date. Turning first to the positive residuals, there are 16 not related to earnings announcements. In our judgment, ten of those are not associated with meaningful news of any type. In fact, in several cases the main news story was the rise in the stock price itself. There were three residuals associated with what could be called fundamental news. Two related to higher than anticipated sales of the Model S. However, higher here means 6,900 in a quarter rather than 6,000 compared to the millions sold by major manufacturers. Moreover, the growth in sales is not sufficient to suggest that our 70 percent growth is too low. If anything, the reverse is true. The other example of fundamental news was the announcement of the planned introduction of a mass market car in 2015. The final three significantly positive residuals were all associated with the release of positive analyst reports. However, those reports failed to contain new fundamental information other than the positive opinions and forecasts of the analysts.
On the negative side, there were seven significant residuals not associated with earnings. Four of those by our count were unrelated to any meaningful information.
Two were associated with fires involving the Model S and the third was associated with a negative analyst report.
The upshot is that the most striking feature of the event study is how little real news arrived during the run-up period. While one might quibble about the details of any particular news release, in the aggregate there is nothing that remotely explains a sevenfold increase in price.
The Impact of Noise Trading
If it is not fundamental information that is driving Tesla's prices during this period, what is the source of price movements? Following the path breaking work of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1990) , an extensive literature blossomed regarding the role of noise traders in financial markets and the limits on the willingness of sophisticated traders to counteract their impact. The basic idea was that noise traders were subject to bouts of sentiment, which could drive a wedge between stock prices and fundamental value. Because of the risk associated with betting against the noise traders, and because of limitations on risk capital, it was hypothesized that there would be situations in which sophisticated traders would fail to fully offset the impact of noise traders. Furthermore, the theory held that the riskier the stock, and the greater the extent to which its value depended on growth options, the more unlikely it would be that the impact of noise traders would not be fully offset.
To evaluate the extent to which the noise trader theory applies to Tesla, we examine the time series of two related statistics: the ratio of individual share holdings to institutional holdings and the ratio of shares sold short to shares outstanding. Exhibit 11 plots both the stock price for Tesla and the institutional ownership as a percentage of the shares outstanding. The figure shows that institutional ownership peaks at about 87 percent just as the run-up begins in late March 2013. It then declines steadily, with some volatility, to approximately 65 percent by the end of the run-up period. The figure provides support for the noise trader theory that as noise traders drove the run-up, the "smart" institutional investors liquidated their positions. However, the evidence is far from overwhelming. Even by the end of the period, when our DCF models predict that the stock was significantly overvalued, institutions still accounted from about two-thirds of the Tesla holdings.
--Exhibit 11 here --
The data in Exhibit 12, which plots short interest as a percent of shares outstanding, are more ambiguous. First, the short interest rises almost monotonically from the IPO to the date at which the run-up began despite the fact that Tesla's stock was not outperforming either the market or the industry during this period. When the run-up begins, the short interest plummets. There are two plausible explanations for the drop.
One, along the lines of Shleifer and Vishny (1990) , is that short sellers are capital constrained so that when losses accumulate, as they would during the run-up, they cannot meet continuing margins calls and are forced to cover their positions. The other explanation, more along the lines of the noise trader literature, is that short sellers become aware of the added volatility of the stock when the run-up begins and, therefore, are unwilling to maintain the level of their short positions in the face of the higher perceived volatility. However, by the time the stock price hits $150, short interest starts to rise again and it increases steadily until the end of the run-up period.
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This suggests that if fundamental investors perceive the overvaluation to be large enough, the higher expected returns of selling short become sufficient to overcome the capital constraints and perceived risk.
--Exhibit 12 here --Overall, the trading data are broadly consistent with a view that the sentiment that drove the run-up came from what have come to be referred to as "noise" traders.
Sophisticated investors did lean against the trend to an extent in that institutional holders were net sellers and short positions rose. However, the magnitude of these offsetting effects was too weak to blunt the sevenfold increase in the price.
Reconciling Price and Value
Looking at the value and price narratives, there is clearly a divergence between price and value that is large. There are two possible explanations. The first is that the value process is missing a key component and that the valuations are therefore understated. For this to be true, it also has to be the case that this key fundamental component has become more important over time since the gap has widened. The second is that the pricing process has lost its fundamental moorings and is increasingly being driven by sentiment and momentum.
Possible Sources of Missing Value
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It is worth noting that throughout the time period following the IPO, Tesla's shares outstanding have been rising because of the exercise of stock options granted to employees and management. As a result, gross short positions have been rising more quickly than the percentages reported in the text.
As stressed earlier, we made an effort to make every assumption as optimistic as reasonably possible when developing our DCF models. There are, however, some factors we did not consider. First, there is a chance that Tesla could be an attractive target for a larger company (either technology or automobile) to acquire as an entrée into either the electric battery or electric automobile market. Over much of the last few years, rumors have floated about Apple, Google and numerous auto companies being interested in acquiring Tesla, even though Elon Musk has been fairly explicit in his assertions that he will not sell the company. To the extent that there is synergy that can accrue from such a merger, research has found that target companies generally capture most of the benefits.
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It is possible, therefore, that the market price of Tesla includes a premium for the expected synergy from an acquisition that we did not include. We note, however, that if our analysis is correct and Tesla price greatly exceeds its fundamental value, a potential buyer, who presumably is both sophisticated and rational would be deterred from making a bid.
Another possible explanation for the value gap is that Tesla's battery technology is so unique and difficult to replicate that it will allow them to use it to enter other markets. In the most recent quarter, for instance, the announcement that Tesla would build a mega factory for electric batteries started a discussion of whether Tesla was planning to enter the electric utility market (and supply power to homes). While this is pretty much sheer speculation given that no specific battery technology has been announced, it could be used as the basis for a real options argument that would add a premium to Tesla's market price of Tesla that we did not include in our valuation. 6 See, for example, Weston, Mitchell and Mulherin (2003) In our opinion, both these possibilities carry little weight. Not only are they speculation unsupported by any direct evidence, but even if they were to come to pass it is not clear that much value would be added.
Taking all the evidence into account, our view is that the conclusion that Tesla's stock price was driven, at least in part, by investor sentiment, stoked by momentum, is inescapable. Even assuming that Tesla would grow at a compound rate of 70 percent per year, transforming it from a niche manufacturer to a company with the market share equal to that of Audi, while maintaining margins comparable to Porsche, we are able to rationalize values only about 40 percent of Tesla's market price. As part of our analysis we constructed a detailed DCF model and used it to value Tesla at three separate dates: prior to the start of the run-up, during the run-up, and at the end of the run-up. The valuations all yield estimates of value that are well below the market price (at the time of the valuation), with price more than two and one-half times an aggressively optimistic estimate of value. From this perspective, we conclude that investor sentiment played an important role in the run-up.
Conclusion
Our event study analysis of the information that arrived during the run-up period leads to a similar conclusion. Though good news did arrive during the run-up period, there were no path-breaking innovations such as the development of new technologies or the introduction of new products. Earnings and revenue surprises were net positive, but not dramatically so. Once again, therefore, we conclude that the price appreciation during the period cannot be explained by fundamentals and must be attributed, at least in part, to investor sentiment.
If a sentiment unrelated to fundamentals played a significant role in the run-up, the standard noise trader model predicts that sophisticated investors would "lean against the wind," but that their willingness to take oversetting positions may be blunted by both noise trader risk and capital constraints. We see some evidence for both effects. The fraction of Tesla stock held by institutions falls consistently during the period and after an initial collapse, short interest increases sharply. It should be stressed, however, that the stock price rose by a factor of seven times even in light of these offsetting forces.
Consequently, the impact of "smart" trading was clearly dominated by sentiment.
To conclude, our case study of Tesla offers support for Summers ' (1986) assertion that stock prices can diverge significantly and persistently from rational fundamental value. But persistently does not mean forever. At some point, as the information about the cash flow generating characteristics of the business become clearer, price and value should start to converge. (TSLA) said it will report its first-ever quarterly profit -for the opening three months of 2013, after delivering more Model S electric cars than it had previously estimated."
Tesla set for first-ever quarterly profit (Financial Times): "Tesla Motors said it was on the verge of reporting its first quarterly profit in its 10-year history, a watershed moment in its attempt to become the electric car industry's first successful start-up. The news sent Tesla's shares up more than a fifth in early trading on Monday in New York to a new high of $45.88, valuing it at more than $5bn." said it revamped a month-old sales program that guarantees the resale value of its about $70,000 plug-in electric car after the program was widely criticized. A new offer guarantees that the Model S will be worth at least 50% of its original cost after three years, up from 43%." The bridge to the gross margin improvement is comprised of higher manufacturing volumes, process improvements, & lower costs from suppliers. Although 1H production faces some battery cell supply constraints, this is expected to improve in 2H as Panasonic increases production. Finally, [Tesla] now expects to produce vehicles at a rate of 1000 cars/week exiting 2014 (up from 600 cars/week currently), a 25% increase from prior guidance for 800 cars/week. The increase in production capability comes from the addition of final assembly capacity, which has thus far been the constraining factor on the factory floor. We expect [Tesla's] Source: Bloomberg.
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